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Notes and Comments
APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO RESTRICTIVE
PRACTICES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
For many years lawyers have apparently believed that the
legal profession was exempt from the application of the Sherman
Act.' But those days of comfortable assurance are gone; bar asso-
ciation minimum fee schedules have been challenged under the
Sherman Act by private parties and the United States.2 This is a
welcome development to critics who have contended that illegal
practices have long been carried on in the name of ethics.
In recent years, commentators have focused on minimum fee
schedules and have almost uniformly condemned them as price
fixing in violation of the Sherman Act;3 little has been written,
however, about potential applications of the Sherman Act to
other restrictive practices of the profession. This comment ana-
lyzes three practices which are possible objects of antitrust at-
tack: minimum fee schedules (here termed "prescriptive" be-
cause they dictate what legal fees should be); informational
schedules of average or actual fees (here termed "descriptive"
because they report what legal fees actually are); and the rule
against solicitation, one of the fundamental ethical tenets of the
1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
The theory that professions are exempt from the Sherman Act achieved a victory of
sorts in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 355 F. Supp. 491
(E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 223 (1974) (argued March 25, 1975), where the
Fourth Circuit held that ethical restraints on competition within the legal profession were
not subject to Sherman Act attack. Contra, United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F.
Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)(dic-
tum): "This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world
may be demoralizing to ethical standards of a profession .. "; Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Coleman, Antitrust Exemptions: The
Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A. ANrrrusT J. 48 (1967).
2. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 223
(1974) (private suit); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Arnould and Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J.
655 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Arnould and Corley]; Morgan, Where Do We Go From
Here With Fee Schedules?, 59 A.B.A.J. 1403 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morgan]; Com-
ment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REv.
1237 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Fee Schedule]; Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar
Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HkAv. L. REv. 971 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Critical Analysis]; Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price Fixing: A Per Se Viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, 22 AM. U. L. REv. 439 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fee Schedules
as Price Fixing]; Note, Goldfarb Fights the Bar, 27 Sw. L. J. 524 (1973); Comment,
Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 TUL. L. REv. 682 (1974).
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profession, which prohibits actively seeking out clients.
The nature and administrative structure of each of these
practices are examined to determine the economic effects on the
price and availability of legal services; a comparison is made with
the application of the Sherman Act to similar practices in other
contexts. Additionally, the profession of law itself is analyzed to
see if it has extraordinary or unusual characteristics which would
indicate that application of the Sherman Act would be bad law
or bad social policy.
I. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Before a restraint may be condemned under the Sherman
Act, the jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce must
be satisfied. Therefore, the first issue which must be resolved is
whether the practice of law has the requisite effect on interstate
commerce.'
The Sherman Act prohibits only those restraints of "trade or
commerce among the several states . . . . 5 The Sherman Act's
use of constitutional language' indicates that Congress intended
for the Act's reach to be co-extensive with its constitutional
power.' However, recent cases suggest that the lower federal
4. "The interstate commerce requirement may be satisfied in two ways. First, the
plaintiff may show that the activity which the defendant has restrained is 'in' commerce.
Second, the plaintiff may show that the activity restrained, although essentially 'local',
has an effect on interstate commerce." Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 332 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961). See also Greenville Publishing Co. v. The Daily Reflector,
Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1974).
Several recent cases have re-examined the relationship between the "in commerce"
theory and the "effects commerce" theory. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S.Ct.
392 (1974) (dictum). See also Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d
678 (4th Cir. 1975), holding that a North Carolina hospital's expansion plans did not
have sufficient effect on interstate commerce to justify invoking the Sherman Act; United
States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., No. 74-1276 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 1975), where it was held that,
if the alleged restraint is upon an activity "in commerce", no adverse effect on interstate
commerce need be alleged or shown.
Thus, the bar's activities in restraining competition both within and without the
profession itself may be brought within the Sherman Act's jurisdiction if it can be shown
(1) that the restraint is upon an activity which is "in commerce" or (2) that the activity
restrained "affects commerce" directly and substantially although it is itself local.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. "Congress shall have power . .. to regulate . . . commerce . . . among the
several states." U.S.CONsT., art. I, § 8.
7. "That Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in
restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . . admits of little, if any, doubt." United
States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) (footnote omitted).
See also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1947): "We do not
mean to establish any absolute rule that local taxicab service to and from railroad stations
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courts view the problem of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
more narrowly than the question of Congress' constitutional
power. This distinction' has been the source of much confusion
in antitrust cases, and is especially important in the case of the
legal profession, where essentially local services are rendered, and
the connection with interstate commerce is indirect.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar9 is the most recent example
of the distinction which has evolved between the constitutional
is completely beyond the reach of federal power or even beyond the scope of the Sherman
Act." (emphasis added).
8. The source of the distinction is unclear. One commentator has suggested that the
courts examine the interstate commerce question more closely in a private suit than in a
suit by the United States. Elgin, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation,
25 FED. BAR J. 282 (1965). In establishing his case, the private plaintiff must show that
his injury affected interstate commerce, while the government may rely on the full extent
of public injury from a restraint of trade. See, e.g., United States v. South Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (effect of entire business of insurance on interstate
commerce is relevant inquiry in government suit).
9. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted,
95 S.Ct. 223 (1974). Goldfarb was a class action on behalf of all residents of Reston, in
Fairfax County, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C. The defendants were the Virginia
State Bar, an integrated bar requiring the membership of all Virginia attorneys, the
Fairfax County Bar Association, a private organization composed of voluntary members,
and two other local bar associations from northern Virginia (who accepted consent decrees
enjoining their minimum fee schedules prior to trial.) The Fairfax County Bar Association
had published a minimum fee schedule in 1969 which, inter alia, set a minimum fee for
title searches involved in real estate transactions. The Goldfarbs, who were buying a home
in Reston, were unable to get their title searched for less than the minimum fee (1% of
the purchase price of the property up to $50,000, and 1/2 of 1% above that amount).
The suit was brought under the Sherman Act for price fixing. The Fairfax County
Bar Association was sued because of its promulgation of the minimum fee schedule setting
the price of title searches, and the Virginia State Bar was cited for publishing, opinions
on ethics indicating that there were circumstances under which attorneys who undercut
their local fee schedules might be subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar. At trial,
the district court concluded that the Fairfax County Bar Association was liable under the
Sherman Act, rejecting its three basic defenses: (1) that the activity restrained, i.e., the
sale of housing in Fairfax County, Virginia, did not directly and substantially affect
commerce between the states; (2) that the Sherman Act does not apply to restraints on
the practice of law and other "learned professions"; and (3) that the minimum fee sched-
ule was a part of the state regulation of the legal profession, and thus not subject to
Sherman Act attack, because the Sherman Act does not apply to state action. The state
action doctrine, formulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 541 (1943), was held applicable
by the district court to the Virginia State Bar and they were consequently not liable. The
Fairfax County Bar Association appealed their finding of liability, and the Goldfarbs the
dismissal of the case against the Virginia State Bar.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
dismissing the case against the Virginia State Bar, but reversed as to the Fairfax County
Bar Association, holding that (1) there exists a "learned profession" exemption from the
Sherman Act which prevents antitrust attack on activities which restrain competition
within the profession and (2) the effect of the minimum fee schedule on the housing
market in Fairfax County did not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to invoke the
Sherman Act. The result of the Fourth Circuit opinion was that there was no liability on
the part of either defendant.
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commerce clause and the Sherman Act commerce clause. In
Goldfarb, the plaintiffs contended that the minimum fee sched-
ule under attack increased the price of homes in Fairfax County,
Virginia, which in turn affected interstate commerce because of
the large percentage of interstate loans which financed home pur-
chases in the County, and because of the large amount of inter-
state commuter traffic between Fairfax County and places of
employment outside Virginia. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that these
factors were not sufficient to show the direct and substantial
effect on interstate commerce necessary to invoke the Sherman
Act. The fact that many residents of Fairfax County commuted
to jobs outside Virginia was considered totally irrelevant to the
question of interstate commerce." The remaining connection, the
10. The district court expressly found that the minimum fee schedule affected the
price of title examination which in turn affected the price of housing within Fairfax
County. The local housing market was deemed to affect interstate commerce by the
district court through three factors:
[1] A significant portion of funds furnished for the purchasing of homes in Fairfax
County comes from without the State of Virginia. All or nearly all of the lenders
making such loans require, as a condition of making the loan, that the title to the
property involved be examined and that title insurance be furnished and paid for
by the home buyer-mortgagor. This alone warrants the conclusion that interstate
commerce is sufficiently affected to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
[2] There is also uncontradicted evidence that a large percentage of persons who
live in Fairfax County work outside of Virginia and [3] that significant amounts
of loans on Fairfax County real estate are guaranteed by the United States Veterans
Administration and Department of Housing and Urban Development, both head-
quartered in the District of Columbia.
355 F. Supp. at 494.
11. The fact that a service may be utilized by one coincidentally engaged in
interstate travel will not establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. This is true
even where one crosses state lines for the sole purpose of purchasing the service.
The interstate commerce which is allegedly affected by the fee schedule is the
financing of home mortgages; the fact that the mortgagor commutes across state
lines to his job is of no interest to the mortgagee or to this court.
497 F.2d at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
The Goldfarb majority followed a line of cases in which Sherman Act jurisdiction was
denied when the attempted connection of the restrained activity to interstate commerce
was the interstate movement of people who utilized a service. See Marston v. Ann Arbor
Property Managers (Management) Ass'n., 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 929 (1971) (apartment house); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th
Cir. 1959) (hospital); Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952)
(same); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973)
(same); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (bar review course); Hotel
Phillips, Inc. v. Journeyman Barbers, 195 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Mo. 1961) (barber shop).
But cf. Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 233 (D. Colo. 1971) (alleged
conspiracy among ski lodges substantially affected interstate travel of vacationers); Con-
tract Buyers' League v. F. & F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 420 F.2d
1191 (7th Cir. 1970) (alleged price fixing by landlords in Chicago affected decision of
person in other states whether to purchase housing).
SHERMAN ACT AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
interstate lending of money to finance home purchases, was held
too remote and incidental an involvement with interstate com-
merce to invoke the Sherman Act. 2
The holding by the Fourth Circuit that the minimum fee
schedule in question did not affect interstate commerce suffi-
ciently to invoke the Sherman Act seems surprising in view of the
expansive interpretation given the commerce clause in the last
three decades; if the premise is accepted that the Sherman Act
extends as far as Congress may constitutionally reach, 3 one must
conclude that Congress could regulate neither the sale of local
housing nor the setting of legal fees. As noted, however, the courts
have apparently drawn a distinction between Sherman Act juris-
diction and Congress' constitutional power under the Sherman
Act. 1
In any case, the commerce result in Goldfarb does not pre-
clude the review of the restrictive practices of the legal profession
under the Sherman Act. A minimum fee schedule which fixes the
price of title examination for residential property admittedly has
an indirect effect on interstate commerce; but if a minimum fee
schedule fixed the price of incorporating a business engaged in
interstate commerce, for example, a different question would be
presented. 5 Therefore, while Goldfarb represents a setback for
private challenges to the legality of minimum fee schedules, there
is no reason to suppose that it raises an insuperable bar to chal-
lenge under the Sherman Act.
II. SELECTED RESTRAINTS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Prescriptive Fee Schedules
Minimum (or prescriptive) fee schedules are in widespread
12. The court apparently considered several factors in concluding that the involve-
ment of interstate home financing did not make all facets of the market subject to the
Sherman Act. First, the nature of the activity "was basically local; the Fairfax County
Bar Association's minimum fee schedule was considered a general local service" which did
not intentionally or directly affect interstate commerce. Second, it was merely a
"fortuitous circumstance" that the plaintiffs who used the title examination services
provided by the members of the Fairfax County Bar Association sought to finance their
homes with out of state lenders. Therefore, the impact of the minimum fee schedule on
interstate commerce was "merely incidental." 497 F.2d at 17-18.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
15. While the general nature of an activity as "local" or intrastate has some weight
in deciding the commerce question, Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co.,
420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969), the legal profession "must take their victims' involvement
in interstate commerce as they find them." Lehman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 36
(5th Cir. 1972). See also Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir.
1974).
1974]
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use today. They are published by state and local associations to
assist lawyers in setting fees for their services.'" The schedules set
forth recommended minimum fees; they are not obligatory, but
the American Bar Association has rendered opinions stating that
consistently charging below the minimum fee might be evidence
of unethical conduct."
Prescriptive fee schedules contain a price list for various legal
services, usually those which can readily be classified such as
drafting simple wills, incorporating small businesses and billing
rates. Typically, minimum fee schedules are prepared by a com-
mittee of the state or local bar association, which purports to set
fees at a level which will ensure at least a fair return to the
practitioner, taking overhead and other expenses into account.'"
These fee schedules do not necessarily indicate what prevailing
fees are, but rather what would be sufficient at least to cover
expenses of an assumed nature and dimension.'9
16. As recently as 1971, thirty-four states had adopted minimum fee schedules;
some were mandatory and some were adopted by the state bar associations for local bars
to consider and adopt if they desired. Arnould and Corley, supra note 3, at 656.
Since 1973, the use of minimum fee schedules has declined partly because of the
challenges to their legality under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Order of Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, approving Kentucky Bar Association resolution abolishing Kentucky's mini-
mum fee schedule. See also resolution of A.B.A. Board of Governors, adopted October
1973:
In order to avoid possible future dispute or litigation, and
a) Without the expression of any opinion upon questions of existing legal
right or obligation, and
b) Notwithstanding the most recent opinion issued by this Association's
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility with regard to the
ethical propriety of the voluntary consideration by lawyers of fees customar-
ily charged for particular legal services in given localities;
The American Bar Association recommends that state and local bar associations
that have not already done so, give serious consideration to withdrawal or cancella-
tion of all schedules of fees, whether or not designated as "minimum" or "sug-
gested" fee schedules.
Reprinted in Hearings of Legal Fees Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Legal Fees].
17. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETICS, OPINIONS, No. 302 (1961); No. 323
(1970).
18. "It is an economic fact that a lawyer must receive a fair and reasonable return
for the legal services rendered if he is to practice his profession with a dignity and maintain
high professional standards in the quality of his work." Foreword, Statewide Suggested
Minimum Fee Schedule, 1967 MD. ST. B. J. 125.
19. The calculation of expenses is necessarily rather crude, because different areas
of a state or even a county have different costs. In Maryland, the committee proposing a
statewide suggested minimum fee schedule defended a single statewide determination of
costs by asserting that rural attorneys' costs were not very much lower than urban costs:
while office space and secretarial help are likely to be cheaper in rural areas, there is less
likelihood that there will be a bar library nearby, meaning that the rural lawyer will have
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There is little doubt that prescriptive fee schedules affect the
price of legal services. One purpose is to create a floor under fees
for legal services. This floor, admittedly above the level of costs,
insures that the income of all lawyers who use the schedules will
be above the "break-even" point. As a class, then, the legal pro-
fession will make higher profits than would be the case if there
were no floor.20 In addition to the clear economic advantages of
the prescriptive fee schedule, the organized bar has made them
an ethical issue" thus guaranteeing a high level of adherence."
An agreement among competitors which has the purpose or
effect of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se", 2 3 without any regard to its justification. Such activities
are generally referred to as price fixing. The publication of a
prescriptive fee schedule by a state or local bar association consti-
tutes such an agreement among competing attorneys under the
Sherman Act. 4
Price fixing was one of the earliest activities held to be a
violation of the Sherman Act. The economic detriment inherent
in price fixing is that prices are set by suppliers acting in concert
rather than by the forces of supply and demand. Any activity
labelled price fixing has been considered per se illegal, because
the device is so detrimental to free competition that it can under
to buy a more extensive library than his urban counterpart. Statewide Suggested Mini-
mum Fee Schedule, 1967 MD. ST. B. J. at 21.
This machete approach to a delicate economic problem is clearly unsatisfactory. The
desire for urban-rural uniformity in legal fees can only be explained as an attempt to
minimize natural price differences.
20. See Criticial Analysis, supra note 3, at 977-78.
21. In addition to the American Bar Association Opinions, supra note 17, attorneys
frequently state that they fear undercutting the minimum fee because it is a violation of
the ethical Rule Against Solicitation. See Brief for appellant at -, Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), reprinted in Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 16,
at 106.
22. See Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 979.
23. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Section 1 is the primary focus of this comment. It states
in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. ...
An "agreement" between two or more persons is a requirement under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). It implies concerted action to achieve a forbidden
result, such as price fixing. Such action may be evidenced by a schedule of prices, as is
the case with minimum fee schedules, and the forbidden result by either direct evidence
of a purpose to use the schedule to actually fix prices, United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), or by an economic advantage to be gained by adherence to a
price schedule, United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
1974]
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no circumstances be considered a "reasonable" activity for com-
petitors to engage in. 5 The development of the per se rule against
price fixing demonstrates that the courts will not accept "ex-
cuses"-i.e., defenses-for such blatantly anticompetitive behav-
ior. 6
The per se rule condemning price fixing developed in situa-
tions involving the sale of commodities in a commercial setting;
the applicability of such a rule to a personal service business was
problematical. But in United States v. National Association of
Real Estate Boards,27 the Sherman Act was applied to the per-
sonal services rendered by real estate brokers in the District of
Columbia. The District's association of brokers promulgated a
schedule of minimum brokerage commissions to be used by mem-
bers. The Board's code of ethics provided that "[b]rokers should
maintain the standard rates of commission and no business
should be solicited at lower rates."2 The Court held that, absent
25. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Cf. Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
26. In United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898), a combine of rail
carriers set prices at a level above what they could have gotten if they had competed. The
defendants attempted to justify their conduct by the nature of their industry. If free
competition were permitted, all the firms would eventually be driven out of business and
the result would be monopolization of the railway industry. This defense against price
fixing was rejected, because the theory of the railroads was conjecture and the effect on
competition of the price fixing agreement was "direct and immediate." Id. at 503. See
also, United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) in which the defendants
claimed that their conduct was not in violation of the Sherman Act because there was no
evidence that the prices fixed by the combination were not reasonable. The Court rejected
this defense because the Sherman Act was not directed toward the level of prices, but the
mechanism which set them:
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves
unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable . . . . [U]niform price-fixing by those
controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce
is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the particular
prices agreed upon.
The landmark case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
articulated the per se rule against price fixing, holding that no excuse would be heard for
activity among competitors that attempted to alter the price for a product that the free
market would set.
In Socony, a group of oil companies combined to purchase gasoline which had been
produced in violation of state law and dumped on the market. Their purpose was to
stabilize the price of gasoline by controlling the supply. There was no evidence of any
agreement actually setting specific prices, but the Supreme Court held that any agree-
ment with the purpose of altering the price was price fixing and therefore illegal per se.
Further, the Court held that the power to control prices was not a necessary element of
the offense of price fixing. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
27. 339 U.S. 485 (1950), rev'g 84 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1949).
28. 339 U.S. at 488.
578
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any statutory exemption from the Sherman Act, 9 there was no
reason to distinguish personal services from the sale of commodi-
ties; that the word "trade" in the Sherman Act included sales of
services as well as goods; 30 and that price fixing in the sale of
services had exactly the same deleterious economic effects as in
the earlier cases involving commodities:
[W]e would be contracting the scope of the concept of
"trade", as used in the phrase "restraint of trade", in a
precedent-breaking manner if we carved out an exemption
for real estate brokers. . . . The competitive standards
which the Act sought to preserve in the field of trade and
commerce seem as relevant to the brokerage business as to
other branches of commercial activity.'
Real Estate Boards thus condemned a practice which is al-
most indistinguishable from prescriptive fee schedules. The
agreement in Real Estate Boards was itself a schedule which
established a floor under brokerage commissions. The Court held
that this schedule was price fixing, and therefore proscribed
under the Sherman Act.32
The fact that there was no evidence that members had been
sanctioned for violating the schedule was immaterial because
"[slubtle influences may be just as effective as the threat or use
of formal sanctions to hold people in line. '33 The mere existence
29. The district court had held that the Sherman Act did not apply to personal
services because of section 6 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), which
stated: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." This,
the court held, exempted all personal labor from all the antitrust laws, including the
Sherman Act. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 84 F. Supp. 802, 803-
04 (D.D.C. 1949). See also 63 HARV. L. Rav. 712 (1950).
The Supreme Court reversed on this point, holding that the Clayton Act section was
to be read as an entirety, and only operated to exempt labor unions from the antitrust
statutes. 339 U.S. at 490.
30. The Court stated that the traditional meaning of the word "trade" was very
broad, quoting from The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 504, 505 (D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388):
Whenever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose
of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or the learned professions,
it is constantly called a trade.
The Court disassociated itself from the reference to the "learned professions," saying
that no opinion as to the Sherman Act's application was intended. Justice Jackson,
however, dissented on the ground that Real Estate Bds. offered no distinction between
real estate brokers and the learned professions. 339 U.S. at 494.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Any "agreement shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof of
consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal under the Sherman
Act .... " Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
33. Id. It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether adherence to a price schedule
is necessary for a finding of price fixing. In the case of the legal profession, however, the
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of an agreement is legally deemed to be price fixing if it purports
to alter the competitively determined price.34
This result-that a prescriptive fee schedule is indeed price
fixing by its mere existence-was the conclusion reached by the
district court in Goldfarb. The prescriptive fee schedule 3. which
had been promulgated by the Fairfax County Bar Association
made it impossible for the plaintiff to obtain a title examination
for less than the fee set in the schedule. The plaintiff considered
the fee excessive, especially because it was based, not on work
performed, but on a percentage of the purchase price of the prop-
erty which was being searched.3 1
The district court held that the schedule did, indeed, unlaw-
fully fix prices; adherence, however, was not required for such a
finding: "A defendant's liability under the Sherman Act depends
not on actual adherence to the schedule but rather on the mere
existence of an agreement which restricts competition by price-
fixing. ' 37 Thus it is clear that while, in this case, there was evi-
dence of adherence, it was not material.38
Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on
the ultimate issue of the Fairfax County Bar's liability, the actual
restraint on price competition in title examinations was acknowl-
edged by the appellate court.39 The prescriptive fee schedule
which purports to influence the price of legal services necessarily
has a similar effect. Thus, under a line of cases which extends
almost to the enactment of the Sherman Act,4" the adoption of a
prescriptive fee schedule by a bar association or other group of
lawyers, is price fixing.
B. Descriptive Fee Schedules
While prescriptive fee schedules are a relatively clear exam-
ple of the traditionally illegal conduct labelled price fixing, there
same "subtle pressures" exist for adherence to an existing minimum fee schedule, such
as opinions on ethics published by the American Bar Association. See note 17 and accom-
panying text supra.
34. Id.
35. The existence of sanctions for persistent failures to charge at least the minimum
fee clearly indicates that the schedule was prescriptive. See VRGINIA STATE BAR, OPINIONS,
No. 98 (1960); No. 170 (1971). A schedule which only reflects existing fees would surely
not be accompanied by formal sanctions.
36. 355 F. Supp. at 497.
37. Id. at 494.
38. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
39. 497 F.2d at 13.
40. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
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are other fee schedules less easily classified. These are descriptive
schedules, which indicate what lawyers in a given area actually
charge for a service. The first inquiry must be the economic effect
of this device on the profession's fee structure. If lawyers have an
economic incentive to lower fees in an attempt to gain new
clients, the absence of ethical sanctions would leave them free to
do so." The chief factor, then, is the competitive climate in which
the descriptive, or informational, schedule operates. If the pur-
pose of the schedule is to maintain prices by creating a schedule
with the expectation of widespread adherence, then it is clearly
illegal. Such a purpose may be inferred from the trend of prices
in the industry at the time the schedule was promulgated . 2 The
chief danger of the device, if it is truly descriptive, is that it will
be used to stabilize, rather than increase, prices.
Descriptive devices, whether within the legal profession or
without, are simply exchanges of information between members
of a group. Trade associations have traditionally compiled infor-
mation and distributed it to members. Such activities are clearly
concerted action among members within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. 3 The remaining issue is whether the concerted
action is an unreasonable restraint of trade and thus violative of
the Sherman Act. The resolution of this issue requires an analysis
of the circumstances surrounding the exchange of information.
The exchange of prices through a trade association has been held
lawful where the information exchanged was not of a character
that encouraged adherence to the stated prices, but where adher-
ence to stated prices was intended or achieved, the Sherman Act
was held to forbid the exchange. 4
41. The presence of formal sanctions for violating the agreement is fatal to its valid-
ity under the Sherman Act, but the absence of sanctions does not mean the agreement is
necessarily valid. It is not the presence of sanctions which makes a fee schedule price
fixing, but the presence of any pressure to adhere to it. Formal sanctions, informal social
pressures or economic advantage may supply the incentive. United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U. S. 485, 491 (1950).
42. Where a decline in prices was slowed by concerted action of competitors ex-
changing price information the exchange was ruled unlawful under the Sherman Act.
United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Similarly, where substantial price
increases followed an exchange of price information, a violation of the Sherman Act was
also established. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
43. United States v. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See generally Stocking, The
Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of Trade Association Activities,
21 U. Ctu. L. REV. 527 (1954); Symposium on Trade Association Activities, 17 ANTITRUST
BuLL. 393 (1972).
44. Three Supreme Court cases form the basic pattern of data dissemination and
price fixing. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), a
1974]
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In the context of the legal profession, the pressure in favor
of adherence primarily comes from formal or informal ethical
requirements in charging for legal services. A truly descriptive fee
schedule"5 may be used as a device to preserve high fee levels
which might otherwise decline; if so, it would be a clearly unrea-
sonable restraint. 46
A price fixing challenge to a descriptive fee schedule pub-
lished by a county bar association in New York was rejected in
trade association distributed a detailed list of prices, inventories, sales and shipments of
each member firm. The data was gathered from members on a voluntary basis, but any
firm which failed to comply was not given a copy of the report. The association encouraged
participation in the program, the obvious objective of which was to persuade all firms to
limit production in order to increase the price. The Supreme Court held the plan to be
an illegal restraint of trade and stated that the "fundamental purpose of the Plan was to
procure harmonious individual action" in order to stabilize the price. The plan, in short,
constituted price fixing. Id. at 409.
Cf. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), where a some-
what similar plan was upheld. The data received by the industry association was complied
and distributed in the aggregate, unlike the American Column case, where the results were
reported on a firm-by-firm basis. Since none of the firms had the opportunity to find out
which firms were cutting prices, there was no noneconomic incentive to make price or
production decisions in accordance with the report because the other firms were unaware
of individual deviations. There was also no economic reason to follow the report as a price
fixing device, because prices were not on the decline at the time. Thus, the Court held
the information program to be just that, and not a scheme to stabilize prices.
The American Column case was reaffirmed and its principles applied to an informal
arrangement to distribute price information in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S.
333 (1969). In that case, there was serious overcapacity in the corrugated container indus-
try and prices were declining. When a customer asked for a price, the manufacturer
checked with the other firms to find out what the last price to that customer was. The
Supreme Court, in a rather cryptic opinion, held that the arrangement was a violation of
the Sherman Act, but did not say what kind of violation it was. The majority opinion cited
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), which would seem to
indicate that the majority considered it price fixing. But Justice Fortas, concurring, said
that he did not regard the majority opinion as declaring a per se violation on the facts
before it. The singular economic situation in the industry, with sagging prices and over-
capacity, may have been the source of Justice Fortas' belief that no per se violation was
found in the case.
45. There is some question whether any schedule quoting a price for legal services
can be "descriptive" unless it considers the multitude of factors which should enter into
the calculation of a fee. A single prevailing fee for a simple will, for example, could not
take into account the vast difference in efficiency between an experienced and inexperi-
enced attorney. The only solution would be to have a multitude of fees for the same
service, which would still be open to the objection that competency is not reflected in
experience.
This comment assumes that there exists a satisfactory method for arriving at a de-
scriptive fee schedule which would still be useful to practicing lawyers and the public.
Perhaps a court faced with a challenge should consider the practical difficulties in formu-
lating a descriptive schedule when deciding upon its legality. In the one case deciding the
question, the court simply stated that the schedule under challenge reflected "customary
fees", and did not pursue the issue. In re Freeman's Estate, 40 App. Div.2d 397, 399, 341
N.Y.S. 2d 511, 515 (4th Dept. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 34 N.Y. 2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480
(1974).
46. Cf. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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In re Freeman's Estate.7 In that case, the sole beneficiary
under Freeman's will contested the award of attorneys' fees to the
lawyer who handled the estate, claiming they were unreasonably
excessive. The Surrogate had calculated the award for attorneys'
fees by using the county bar association's minimum fee schedule,
and the heir claimed that the award was invalid because the
schedule violated the New York antitrust law.48
The Appellate Division held that the county bar association's
fee schedule was a "reasonable" restraint of trade and therefore
not a violation of the state antitrust law. However, the court did
not consider whether the price fixing label could properly be ap-
plied to this fee schedule since, under the New York law, there
are no per se violations, and all restraints should be critically
analyzed to determine their reasonableness. 9
The court then turned to the fee schedule itself. In order to
show that the schedule illegally restrained trade, the petitioner
had the burden of presenting some "empirical data" that the
schedule had damaged the public or had been designed with such
a purpose in mind."° Petitioner's only evidence on this point was
the "impressive array of formal sanctions" available against the
attorney who charged less than the minimum fee indicated in the
schedule.5' The court ruled that this was insufficient to show
47. 40 App. Div. 2d 397, 341 N.Y.S.2d 511 (4th Dept. 1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y. 2d 1, 311
N.E. 2d 480 (1974).
48. The Donnelly Act, New York's "little Sherman Act", provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby
Competition or the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be
restrained...
' * . is hereby declared to be against public policy, illegal and void.
Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(1) (McKinney 1970). Compare Maryland's new
antitrust statute, specifically exempting all bar association minimum fee schedules. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 83, § 39(11) (1974 Supp.).
49. 40 App. Div. 2d at 399, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The Court of Appeals did not
consider whether price fixing was illegal per se under the Donnelly Act. The Appellate
Division's consideration of this issue, and the economic analysis under it is, however, still
valid in view of the Court of Appeals decision, in which the same factors were used to
determine if the fee schedule was a violation of professional ethics rather than state
antitrust law. 34 N.Y.2d at -, 311 N.E.2d at 484-85.
50. 40 App. Div. 2d at 399, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 515. Cf. United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950), where the deleterious economic effects of the
prescriptive schedule of brokerage commissions were presumed. See text accompanying
notes 33-34, supra.
51. 40 App. Div. 2d at 400, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 515. See, e.g., A.B.A. COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETmics, OPnONs, No. 302 (1961):
While minimum fee schedules can only be suggested or recommended and cannot
be made obligatory. . . the habitual charging of the fees less than those established
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actual damage to the public, because it had not been demon-
strated that an attorney had been disciplined for violating the fee
schedule, and, in fact, lawyers were free to charge whatever they
liked for their services.5 2 In view of the voluntary nature of the fee
schedule, the court determined that it was "in fact not a 'mini-
mum' fee schedule but intended merely as a means of providing
some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees by reflecting
customary fees for routine work charged in the community."53
The Appellate Division in Freeman's Estate concluded that
the schedule was in fact descriptive and that no purpose to fix
prices had been shown, but the further problem of effect was not
considered. If, in actual practice, the schedule guided attorneys
in the calculation of their fees in such a way as to stabilize them,
the schedule fixed prices within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Such a situation would be present if there were an incentive on
the part of attorneys to preserve existing fees, either because the
free market price was declining, or a previous restraint of trade
had maintained artificially high prices. In the latter situation, the
descriptive schedule of fees, while accurately reflecting the "going
rate", also preserves the artificially high fees which have pre-
vailed over much of the nation due to the widespread use of
prescriptive minimum fee schedules. The rates set through the
use of an illegal restraint may not be preserved by any other
means, or the means themselves constitute price fixing.54 As long
as prevailing rates reflect the influence of impermissible re-
straints of trade, descriptive schedules will tend to preserve them,
and therefore unlawfully fix prices. Beyond that, it seems fair to
conclude that descriptive fee schedules are a reasonable device,
especially when used by courts in setting legal fees.
C. The Rule Against Solicitation
The primary source of regulation of the legal profession is the
ethical standards of conduct expressed in the American Bar Asso-
ciation Code of Professional Responsibility.55 The Code is binding
in suggested or recommended minimum fee schedules, or the charging of such fees
without proper justification, may be evidence of unethical conduct....
See also id., No. 323 (1970).
52. 40 App. Div. 2d at 400, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
55. The ABA Code has three types of pronouncements. The Canons are very
generalized statements representing "axiomatic norms". The Ethical Considerations
(ECs) are "aspirational in character", representing ideals of ethical conduct. The Discipli-
nary Rules (DRs) are minimum standards, the violation of which subjects a lawyer to
[VOL. XXXIV
1974] SHERMAN ACT AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 585
on members of the ABA and on all attorneys in states which
have adopted the Code."6 These ethical standards are expressed
in nine canons which set standards governing the relationship of
lawyers with other lawyers and laymen.
Canon Two deals with the acquisition of clients and the man-
ner of setting and collecting fees. 7 The disciplinary rules under
this canon prohibit the use of any communication of a "self-
laudatory" nature which is designed to attract clients."8 All com-
mercial advertising is strictly prohibited. 9 The use of professional
notices, change of address announcements, stationery, telephone
listings and law lists are strictly controlled and only permitted for
purposes of identification and not for solicitation. 0 Unsolicited
recommendation of oneself or a partner or associate is prohib-
ited,' as is any payment to anyone for a similar recommenda-
disciplinary action. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 11-26 (1971), setting forth the
Maryland disciplinary procedure. The Maryland State Bar Association recommends to
the circuit courts that disciplinary action be taken against a lawyer who violates the DRs,
which are contained in the Maryland Rules of Procedure. MD. R. 1230, APP. F. See
generally, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement at 1-2.
56. In Maryland, the ABA Code has been adopted by the Court of Appeals and
therefore binds every lawyer in Maryland. See MD. R. 1230.
57. Canon 2 states: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available."
58. A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in
the use of, any form of public communication that contains professionally self-
laudatory statements calculated to attract lay clients; as used herein, "public com-
munication" includes, but is not limited to, communication by means of television,
radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, or book.
ABA CODE, DR 2-101(A).
59. A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner or associate as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announce-
ments, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his be-
half. . .
Id., DR 2-101(B).
60. A lawyer or law firm shall not use professional cards, professional an-
nouncement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings, law lists,
legal directory listings, or similar professional notices or devices, except that the
following may be used in dignified form:
(1) A professional card . ...
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associa-
tions or addresses . ...
(3) A sign on or near the door of the office . ...
(4) A letterhead . . ..
(5) A listing of the office of a lawyer or law firm in the alphabetical and
classified sections of the telephone directory . . ..
(6) A listing in a reputable law list . . ..
Id., DR 2-102(A).
61. A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice
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tion. 2 In substance, this series of prohibitions forms a Rule
against solicitation which proscribes any positive effort designed
to attract clients and requires the lawyer to wait for clients to
come to him . 3
The effect of the Rule on the market for legal services is
profound, because it eliminates advertising, normally a major
avenue for consumer choice in our society. The less educated, less
sophisticated and less affluent, usually remain generally unin-
formed of their legal rights, and the Rule against solicitation
prevents attorneys from stimulating demand among that group. 4
The primary burden of the smaller demand falls on small practi-
tioners who rely substantially on middle class demand, rather
than members of large metropolitan firms. The latter
can swell their business at country clubs and cocktail par-
ties, using methods either outside Canon Two's prohibitions
or beyond the scope of its enforceability. Moreover, their
clients, usually corporations, almost invariably have a lively
appreciation of the need for legal services."
Not all small practitioners are equally affected by the Rule;
those who are new in practice are hurt the most by it, because it
prevents them from establishing themselves in the community.
Small practitioners who are well established see the Rule as an
advantage and generally support it, at least partly because of its
effectiveness as a barrier to new competition."
regarding employment of a lawyer.
Id., DR 2-103(A).
62. Except as permitted under DR 2-103(C) [dealing with lawyer referral
services set by a bar association], a lawyer shall not compensate or give anything
of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a
client ....
Id., DR 2-103(B). For standards for operation of an approved lawyer referral service, see
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 291 (1956).
63. Solicitation for its own sake and for the profit of the individual attorney is
prohibited entirely, but certain documents are permitted to contain a lawyer's name and
profession because the profession feels it is desirable even though they may incidentally
amount to solicitation: political advertisements (DR 2-101(B)(1)); legal documents (DR
2-101(B)(4)); legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications (DR 2-101(B)(5)).
64. The unfairness of the Rule as applied to small practitioners has prompted pro-
posals for a "double standard", with lawyers from large firms held to the present standard
and small practitioners allowed to solicit to some extent. See Schuchman, Ethics and
Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
244 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schuchman]. See also Comment, Legal Ethics and Pro-
fessionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970).
65. Note, Legal Ethics-Advertising and Solicitation by Public Interest Law Firms,
51 TEx. L. REv. 169, 171 n.8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Advertising and Solicitation].
66. Id. Similar economic motives are probably behind the opposition of small practi-
tioners to neighborhood law offices set up by public interest law firms to serve the poor.
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Demand for legal services is almost certainly lower than if
there were no Rule. There are now few effective ways for a client
to find a lawyer, even if he knows that he needs one. 7
Artificially constricted demand among middle income con-
sumers necessarily affects the level of legal fees. The client who
desires legal advice has little opportunity to "shop" for the best
price available for the service he desires. The economic incentive
for lawyers to cut prices to attract more business vanishes be-
cause the consumer will never know how the prices of several
attorneys compare. Thus, the Rule removes competitive pres-
sures from the profession and allows prices to remain artificially
high.6
In a normal commercial setting, an agreement between com-
petitors to refrain from advertising prices has been struck down
as price fixing. In United States v. Gasoline Retailers
Association," a group of service station owners entered into an
agreement with their employees' union which included a provi-
sion that the owners would not advertise the price of their gaso-
line. It was further agreed that no premiums would be used by
the gas stations to attract customers. The admitted purpose of
these agreements was to prevent the recurrence of gasoline price
wars in the area.
In affirming a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act
against the Retailers Association, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit noted that the intended effect was to remove the
incentive for discount pricing by preventing the public from find-
ing out about it. Therefore, the agreement was a clear attempt
to set a floor under prices and, as such, constituted price fixing.70
The Rule against solicitation in the legal profession may be
attacked on a similar theory. The ban on solicitation is an agree-
ment to curtail competition7 among lawyers. As such, it clearly
See Comment, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor,
80 HAv. L. REv. 805, 842-45 (1967). See also Schuchman, supra note 64, at 262-63.
67. The lawyer referral services permitted by the ABA Code are often nothing more
than answering services for a group of lawyers. They are only a compendium of names;
there is no qualitative evaluation involved. Thus, there is no real assistance in the intelli-
gent selection of a lawyer.
68. The total lack of price competition in the offering of legal services presents an
ideal climate for prescriptive fee schedules to operate, since whatever price may be set by
the bar will remain stable. See part II A, supra.
69. 265 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).
70. Id. at 690.
71. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where an agree-
ment between investment bankers to keep up the price of newly issued securities was
sustained, at least partially because of the economic necessity of the arrangement. The
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restrains trade. The justification that professional ethics requires
the imposition of such a restriction is not directed toward eco-
nomic effects; rather, it concerns uniquely professional considera-
tions and cannot alter the determination that the Rule is econom-
ically restrictive." Unless the bar can show that the business
efficiency of the provision of legal services is enhanced by the
Rule against solicitation, then as a preliminary matter it is an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the traditional dic-
tates of the Sherman Act." The next question must be Whether
the unique considerations of professional ethics override the eco-
nomic policy of the Sherman Act.
III. THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE POLICY OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
The controversy over whether the Sherman Act should be
applied to the ethical rules of the legal profession stems from the
nature of the profession itself. Its "product" is not fungible serv-
ices which can be easily interchanged; rather it is a professional
service, tailored to the individual needs of each client. Further-
more, while similar in some ways to other professions, the prac-
tice of law differs in one important respect in that lawyers are
"officers of the court."74 This means that they are under the juris-
diction of, and at least theoretically regulated by, the highest
court of the state in which they practice. These distinctive fea-
new issue of securities would very likely have been curtailed had such agreements between
banking houses been condemned under the Sherman Act. This argument does not apply
to the ban on solicitation practiced by the legal profession. Therefore, the Rule against
solicitation must be justified on a non-economic basis in order to be sustained under the
Sherman Act.
72. Social benefit or efficiency unrelated to the economic effects of an activity has
repeatedly been held irrelevant to the restraint of trade issue. United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Cf. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The ethical arguments in favor of the Rule against solicitation should be separated
from the determination of whether it is restrictive. Ethical considerations are properly
considered in deciding the issue of professional immunity. See notes 115-26 and accompa-
nying text infra.
73. Although arguably an example of price fixing, similar to the agreement in
Gasoline Retailers, the Rule against solicitation is, in any event, an "unreasonable re-
straint" within the meaning of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
because of its other effects on competition among lawyers, such as curtailing demand for
legal services.
74. Lawyers have a duty to the judicial system independent of their client's inter-
ests. This duty makes lawyers "officers" of the court. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsIBILMrY, DR 4-101(C)(2) (lawyer may be required to disclose client confidences to
the court).
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tures suggest that two rationales are available to exclude profes-
sional ethics from the policy of the Sherman Act. First, legal
ethics might be given professional immunity based on the nature
of the professional services rendered and the ethical considera-
tions involved. Alternatively, the profession might be exempted
to the extent that it is deemed to be regulated by the state under
the doctrine of Parker v. Brown.75
A. The Doctrine of Professional Immunity
For many years the legal profession has assumed that at least
its ethical structure had the benefit of immunity from the anti-
trust laws.7" Lawyers relied on dicta in several Supreme Court
cases which stated that professions were governed by ethical con-
siderations not present in the commercial world." The justifica-
tion of an exemption based on the professional immunity ration-
ale has two aspects. First, there is "total" immunity, which would
exclude professional ethics from any application of the Sherman
Act. Secondly, there is partial immunity which would allow some
ethical practices to be sustained if justifications uniquely pro-
fessional outweigh detrimental economic effects.
75. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See text accompanying notes 132-51 infra.
76. See Coleman, Antitrust Exemptions-The Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST J. 48 (1967); Note, Mr. Goldfarb Fights the Bar, 27 Sw. L.J. 524 (1973). See
also Miller and Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972).
77. See Goldfarb, in which the court of appeals based the learned-profession exemp-
tion on language in two Supreme Court cases:
Those cases hold that one engaged in the practice of a profession "follow[s] a
profession and not a trade" and that such "personal effort, not related to production
is not a subject of commerce."
497 F.2d at 13 (footnotes omitted), quoting F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653
(1931), and Federal Base Ball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952);
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 291 U.S. 608 (1935).
See generally Comment, The Application of the Sherman Act to the Practices of Law
and Other "Non-Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Non-Commercial Activities]; Fee Schedules as Price Fixing, supra note 3, at 450; Wiscon-
sin Fee Schedule, supra note 3, at 1254; Comment, Antitrust Law: An Application of the
Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 740 (1973).
Courts have largely avoided the question of professional immunity by holding that
professionals whose activities restrained trade in non-professional pursuits were subject
to the Sherman Act. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 317 U.S. 519 (1943)
(doctors restrained sale of group health insurance); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical
Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962) (pharmacists
restrained sale of prescription drugs).
Goldfarb followed these cases and held that the "professional immunity" doctrine
exempted only those restraints within the profession from the antitrust laws. 497 F.2d at
15. Clearly, however, all such restraints affect the availability of legal services to the
public. It is submitted that the distinction drawn by the courts is therefore inappropriate.
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The Sherman Act declares that "every contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States .. .is hereby declared to be illegal . . .,.
By combining the phrases "restraint of trade", a common law
term of art,7" and "commerce among the several states", a juris-
dictional phrase found in the Constitution, 0 the "trade or com-
merce" requirement has emerged. Lawyers have argued that the
profession's ethical structure should be immune since it is neither
"trade" nor "commerce" within the meaning of the statute.'
The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that the
congressional purpose was to attack abuses of the competitive
system wherever they occurred, 2 and generally, the Act has been
interpreted to give it wide application. 3 Only in the case of pro-
fessional baseball has the "trade or commerce" language been
.held not applicable by the Supreme Court, thus affording a basis
for antitrust immunity, and the validity of extending the Court's
reasoning to activities other than baseball is highly doubtful. 4 In
short, the cases supply no authority for the exemption of an entire
profession from the Sherman Act regardless of the circumstances.
It has also been suggested that the statutory words "trade or
commerce" and the statutory history limit application of the
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
79. The common law roots of the action of monopoly or restraint of trade are re-
viewed in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 55-60 (1911). The phrase "re-
straint of trade" was used to confer on federal courts the power to invoke the common
law rule and to expand it. See 21 CONG. Rac. 2156 (1889) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
80. "The Congress shall have Power .... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
81. See Non-Commercial Activities, supra note 77, at 321. See also Fee Schedules
as Price-Fixing, supra note 3, at 450; Wisconsin Fee Schedule, supra note 3, at 1254.
82. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1889) (remarks of Senator Sherman). See also Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940).
83. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491 (1950);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Cf. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
84. In Federal Base Ball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the Supreme
Court held that major league baseball was not covered by the Sherman Act because the
main event, the game, was local and interstate travel was only incidental. The Court
stated that "personal effort, not related to production, is not an article of commerce." Id.
at 209.
Thirty years later this issue was again raised in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953). By this time the commerce clause had been reinterpreted and construed
broadly to extend to any activities which affected commerce, see United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). But in Toolson the Court again refused to place baseball within the
reach of the Sherman Act, because Congress had had the opportunity to overrule Federal
Base Ball by legislation and had failed to do so. 346 U.S. at 357. This result was reaffirmed
in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Thus, baseball's exemption stems from a combina-
tion of congressional inaction and stare decisis, not any reasoned analysis of the scope of
the Sherman Act. See Non-Commercial Activities, supra note 77, at 323.
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Sherman Act to commercial enterprises, or at least to agreements
having a commercial purpose. Supporters of this reasoning would
exclude professional ethics from antitrust liability because the
restraints challenged are motivated by noncommercial concerns,
even though they may economically benefit some individual law-
yers."5
In the area of private education, this theory was accepted in
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Associa-
tion of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc."8 In this case, the de-
fendant was an accrediting agency which refused to accredit Mar-
jorie Webster solely because the school was operated for profit. 7
Marjorie Webster contended that the failure to accredit was a
group boycott by all the member schools which violated the Sher-
man Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit declared, however, that the refusal of the Middle States As-
sociation to grant accreditation was not subject to Sherman Act
scrutiny because there was no commercial motivation behind the
refusal:
[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were "tailored.
for the business world," not for the noncommercial aspects
of the liberal arts and learned professions. In these contexts,
an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose
to affect the commercial aspects of the professions, is not
sufficient to warrant application of the antitrust laws.88
Although the conclusion that setting educational standards
through accreditation is a "noncommercial" aspect of education
may be easily reached, the same is not true of the "ethical" re-
straints practiced by the legal profession. For example, prescrip-
tive fee schedules are designed partially to serve ethical ends by
insuring an adequate income for lawyers;89 the Rule against solici-
85. Goldfarb, 497 F.2d at 10, 14, 15. In re Freeman's Estate, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d
480 (1974). See also Coleman, Antitrust Exemptions-The Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST J. 48 (1967); Fee Schedules as Price Fixing, supra note 3, at 452-54. See
generally Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REv. 654
(1962).
86. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1971).
87. The accrediting agency was a non-profit corporation which had a uniform rule
against accrediting any institution which operated for profit, as Marjorie Webster did.
There was no evidence that the refusal to accredit Marjorie Webster was based on any-
thing other than a genuine assumption that non-profit schools were of a better quality
than those which operated for a profit.
88. Id. at 654.
89. See, LEGAL ECONOMICS PUBLICATION, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES-DEVELOPMENT
AND UTILIZATION (1970). See also Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw. L.J.
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tation could easily be found to have as one of its purposes the
reduction of competition between lawyers. At best, therefore, the
noncommercial motivation of the profession is mixed with com-
mercial concerns, unlike the facts found in Marjorie Webster.
The question remains whether, in spite of partially commer-
cial concerns, legal ethics should be held exempt from the Sher-
man Act. It is suggested that they should not. Total exclusion of
legal ethics from the antitrust laws would, in effect, treat severe
and direct restraints on competition as "noncommercial"; such
an outcome would sacrifice the most basic purposes of the Sher-
man Act to tenuous arguments about adequate and competent
services for clients without evaluating those arguments. It is sub-
mitted that each restraint 0 should be evaluated on its merits.
The ethical purpose should be weighed against the extent of the
anticompetitive harms, and only those restraints clearly benefi-
cial on balance allowed to stand.9 ' Those restraints which have
anticompetitive effects without offsetting ethical benefits would
be condemned; but those which are reasonably limited to serve a
bona fide noneconomic purpose would be upheld. The proper
analytical focus is thus not on the entire ethical structure of the
profession as either "immune" or "not immune", but rather on
each practice as it is challenged under the Sherman Act.
In applying this approach, consider first the possible analysis
of a prescriptive fee schedule. It has the effect of fixing prices, and
in almost any other setting such schedules would certainly be
struck down without any opportunity for justification.2 Never-
theless, if there is a purely professional reason so compelling as
to make prescriptive fee schedules indispensable for the contin-
ued regulation of legal ethics it should probably be given effect. 3
565 (1970); Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 977-80; Fee Schedules as Price Fixing, supra
note 3, at 441.
90. See Part II, supra, for an economic analysis of the restraints most susceptible
to Sherman Act attack.
91. This approach is a variation on the standard "Rule of Reason" analysis which
is the standard for most Sherman Act cases. Under the standard rule of reason, the
economic harms and benefits of a restraint are balanced, and the challenged restraint is
upheld if its beneficial effects outweigh the harmful ones. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 55-60 (1911). See also Maple Flooring Institute v. United States, 268
U.S. 586 (1925); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
92. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485
(1950) (real estate brokerage commissions); Northern Calif. Pharm. Ass'n v. United
States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962) (sale of prescription
drugs); United States v. Utah Pharm. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd per curiam,
371 U.S. 24 (1962) (same).
93. It could forcefully be argued that the classic per se rule should apply and that
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However, any such justification should be very convincing to sus-
tain the validity of prescriptive fee schedules under a theory of
limited professional immunity.
Several ethical justifications have been offered for prescrip-
tive fee schedules: (1) that they act as a guide for the lawyer,
thereby minimizing the likelihood that he will charge too little
and be forced to cut corners in service; (2) that they lead to
greater public awareness of fee levels, thereby preventing serious
overcharging; and (3) that they are an effective means of enforc-
ing the Rule against solicitation by preventing fee cutting. 4
Considering each justification in turn, economic betterment
of the bar is advanced by proponents of the prescriptive schedule
as a means of ensuring that a fair return can be earned on a
manageable number of cases handled in a competent way. This
argument is insufficient, however; a finding of validity requires a
further showing that increased income per case necessarily re-
duces the caseload of the individual lawyer. It is likely that some
lawyers will still handle too many cases while charging the higher
rates set forth in the prescriptive fee schedule. If they do not, it
will be because they feel the responsibility to handle only as many
cases as they can work on competently-a belief that would be
present with or without the prescriptive fee schedule. To the ex-
tent that economic compulsion would force lawyers to choose
between increasing their case load beyond acceptable levels and
turning to other pursuits, the free market will determine how
many lawyers enter the industry. In short, the existence of higher
fees does not necessarily increase the quality of services, and the
restraint therefore alters the free market result with no certain
benefit at all.
Turning next to the argument that prescriptive fee schedules
are useful informational devices, it is possible that a purely de-
scriptive fee schedule would serve the purpose of informing the
public, bench and bar of the current level of fees without seriously
disrupting the operation of the market place. 5 However, informa-
tion about average fees would fully serve the purpose of prevent-
any plea for special treatment should be addressed to the legislature and not the courts.
See Comment, Judicial Exemptions Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Gap-Filling, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 615 (1968).
In exceptional circumstances, however, courts have been receptive to arguments
which attempt to apply the rule of reason to restraints which can only be described as
price-fixing. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United
States v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
94. See Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 981-92.
95. See notes 41-54 and accompanying text supra.
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ing overcharging and imparting knowledge to the public of cus-
tomary charges for services in the community. The descriptive
schedule would be less restrictive and fully serve the bar's stated
purpose.
Finally, it is argued that the Rule against solicitation is sup-
ported by the prescriptive fee schedule because price-cutting is a
form of solicitation; by preventing price competition, a tool of
solicitation is thereby removed. However, the Rule against solici-
tation wholly prevents the advertising of fees by the individual
lawyer." While cutting fees might not be a direct violation of the
Rule, the communication of these fees to the public is a violation.
The only additional purpose served by the prescriptive fee sched-
ule is to prevent any fee-cutting at all, and thus to insure that
such information is never made available to anyone. This again
is overprotective; the legitimate danger of solicitation is very
slight when compared to the economic effect of forcing all fees to
be at or above a minimum level. The ethical benefits of the Rule
may thus be preserved without the serious detriment caused by
prescriptive fee schedules.
The arguments in favor of preserving prescriptive fee sched-
ules were advanced in Goldfarb. The district court did not con-
sider individual justifications at length, but approached the pro-
fessional immunity problem in much the same way as was sug-
gested here.97 The court apparently conceded that there might, in
some circumstances, be immunity for some practices having to do
with professional ethics, but concluded that such a concept,
whatever its extent, did not protect a prescriptive fee schedule.9 8
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied a more
96. See notes 55-73 and accompanying text supra.
97. The district court questioned whether minimum fee schedules were "profes-
sional" at all:
It seems to the Court that there is a basic inconsistency between the very position
that professional services, not commodities, are here involved and the position that
a minimum fee schedule is proper. The former properly contemplates differences
in abilities, worth and energies expended of those rendering the services.
355 F. Supp. at 494.
98. Id. The court compared the effect of a prescriptive fee schedule on the legal
profession and on the automobile industry, concluding in each case the "seller" would gain
the same advantages of more easily setting prices and earning a profit adequate to allow
further research and development or education.
Yet in none of these instances would a member of the public have any better idea
that the fee or price was reasonable after he had seen the schedule than he did
before.
Id.
The court did not expressly consider the arguments made by the bar that allegedly
separated the legal profession from commercial pursuits; however, it is clear that the court
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pervasive standard of immunity, and held that the schedule was
not subject to antitrust attack at all insofar as it affected compe-
tition between lawyers. That court took the view that a "learned
profession" exemption clearly existed and that the only remain-
ing issue was its extent."
The court, per Boreman, J., stated that the basis of the
"learned profession" exemption was the difference between com-
mercial and professional behavior. In contrast to commercial pur-
suits, the legal profession has rejected "the maxim of caveat
emptor as a standard of conduct."'' 0 The court held that the
profession has a duty to provide legal services to those who cannot
afford them, and is subject to ethical restrictions, "many of which
are in direct contravention of" the principles of antitrust. 101
was unwilling to extend the blanket of antitrust immunity over all professional activities,
and that the fee schedule under challenge was one of the least defensible aspects of the
profession. While it is unfortunate that more analysis of the profession's arguments was
not undertaken, Judge Bryan's conclusion seems correctly based on a theory of balancing
interests. Id. at 494, 495.
99. Goldfarb, 497 F.2d at 13-14. In reversing the district court on the applicability
of the Sherman Act to a bar association prescriptive fee schedule, the fourth circuit relied
on dicta in two Supreme Court cases, F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), and
Federal Base Ball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Neither of these
cases concerned learned professions directly.
In Raladam, a drug company marketed a nostrum which claimed to cure obesity. The
F.T.C. held that the claim was false, and an unfair method of competition in violation of
§ 5 of the F.T.C. Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction because, inter alia, there was no affirmative showing of the effect of
the advertisement on competition in the sale of drugs. The American Medical Association
asserted that the drug was dangerous, and the advertising was against the public interest.
In response the Court stated:
Of course, medical practitioners . . . are not in competition with respondent. They
follow a profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of making
or vending remedies but in prescribing them.
283 U.S. at 653.
In Federal Base Ball, the reference to "learned professions" was similarly oblique,
since the issue there was whether professional baseball was in interstate commerce. See
note 84 supra.
In later cases, the Supreme Court has expressly refused to advance an opinion as to
the status of the professions under the Sherman Act. United States v. Oregon State
Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485 (1950). In this light the value of the language in Raladam and Federal Base
Ball is very questionable.
100. 497 F.2d at 14.
101. Unlike the mechanic or the butcher, a lawyer has a professional duty to
provide his services at a reduced rate to those who need but cannot afford his
services. Advertising and other forms of solicitation of business common to trade
and commerce are criminal acts when utilized by lawyers. In view of the special
form of regulation already imposed upon those in the legal profession the courts
have been reluctant to superimpose upon the profession the sanctions of the anti-
trust laws. ...
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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After stating the basis for the exemption, the court went on
to articulate the legal standard for its application:
[T]he promulgation of a fee schedule has a sufficient part
in the overall scheme devised by the State of Virginia to
regulate the legal profession to claim the form of limited
immunity to antitrust prosecution available under the
"learned profession" exemption."°'
It is submitted that the standard developed by the court does
not coincide with the reasons for the exemption as the court artic-
ulated them. Setting aside the possibility that the court's stan-
dard exempts conspiracies between individual lawyers, the "ethi-
cal" restraints challenged under the Sherman Act might restrain
competition only within the profession and yet be unnecessary to
any system of ethics established by the bar. Thus, it seems that
the Fourth Circuit has adopted a standard of limited review of
ethical restraints, wherein any restraint tied in with legal ethics
by the bar will not be examined by a court unless it can be found
to restrain trade outside of the profession.
The Supreme Court has stated that exemptions from the
antitrust laws are to be disfavored, and should operate only to the
extent necessary to effectuate the policy on which they are
based.103 By extending the "learned profession" exemption to in-
clude all restraints which form a "part" of the ethical structure
of the profession, and not only those necessary to preserve that
structure, the Fourth Circuit opinion did not adhere to the princi-
ple articulated by the Supreme Court.', 4
102. Id. at 15.
103. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Supreme Court
faced the problem of reconciling the antitrust laws with the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). In giving effect to the antitrust laws, the Court held that the
Exchange Act should be construed to impliedly repeal the Sherman Act "only if necessary
to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary." Id. at 357.
Such a notion of necessity is even more important where the exemption is not inferred
from another act of Congress, but from the words of the Sherman Act. Cf. In re Freeman's
Estate, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 413 (1974) (state regulation of legal profession through
court rules as evidence of legislature's intent to exclude the profession from the state
antitrust statute).
104. Compare United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974),
where the court held that there was no "learned profession" exemption from the Sherman
Act, at least for price fixing activities such as prescriptive fee schedules. In rejecting the
defendant's arguments against applying the Sherman Act to the legal profession, the court
held that it was improper to evaluate the schedule simply as part of the regulation of legal
ethics: "The fee schedule should be examined apart from the general regulatory scheme;
such an examination would disclose little public benefit." Id. at 513.
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Under the standard of limited review adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, it seems clear that all restraints imposed by the bar in
the name of ethics would be immune from Sherman Act liability.
However, if the court considers the real necessity of a restraint to
the ethical scheme, the results may well not be as uniform. There
are clearly serious anticompetitive effects associated with pre-
scriptive fee schedules, and it has been demonstrated that the
countervailing benefits claimed by their proponents fall far short
of justifying their continued existence.0 5 Prescriptive fee sched-
ules should therefore be condemned under the Sherman Act.
Descriptive fee schedules, on the other hand, present a some-
what different problem, in that they are by definition only infor-
mational, and based on studies of actual legal fees. Being only
informational, a purpose to fix prices is not easily proven, and the
necessary economic effect may also be lacking. Thus, the descrip-
tive fee schedule may not violate the Sherman Act at all."0 6 As-
suming that the descriptive fee schedule preserves illegally deter-
mined prices,'"7 however, the question must again be faced of
whether the ethical or noneconomic advantages of the descrip-
tive fee schedule mandate its preservation.
As long as descriptive fee schedules are widely distributed to
the public, the very definite need of prospective clients for infor-
mation on prices and availability of legal services would be satis-
fied. 10 With this information in hand, clients could effectively
"shop" for the best price'"' which would tend to prevent a uni-
form, rigid price structure. The public availability of information
concerning fees would enhance the operation of the competitive
market and is therefore desirable." 0
105. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 41-54 and accompanying text supra.
107. Prices which have been set through the influence of price fixing devices such
as prescriptive fee schedules may not lawfully be preserved by another device. United
States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
108. The advantages of descriptive fee schedules are set forth in Morgan, supra note
3, at 1406: "Limiting fee reporting to historical data or determining 'proper' fees through
a disinterested panel would protect the public as the antitrust laws properly require, and
yet would provide the kind of reasonable compromise that the situation demands."
109. Price shopping is regarded by some as an evil; however, this is true only if price
shopping misleads the public in choosing legal services. If price reflects the quality of
service offered, then, above a certain minimum level, clients may choose the quality of
legal services desired. There is no reason that price shopping itself is inherently evil in
the legal setting. See Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 980.
110. "If citizens overestimate the cost of legal assistance . . . they might not seek
it at all. Accurate information for reasoned decisions is important to them and should not
be prohibited unthinkingly . . . . Presumably some sort of consensus on reasonableness
would continue to be useful." Morgan, supra note 3 at 1405.
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The ethical justifications for a descriptive fee schedule are
not overwhelmingly clear, but the primary ethical purpose would
appear to be the prevention of discount pricing and overcharging
by lawyers. Discount pricing may not be prevented without run-
ning afoul of the Sherman Act's ban against price fixing;'" to the
extent that the legal profession makes discount pricing ethically
wrong, it is to prevent solicitation and shoddy service, and those
ethical rationales can be sustained without resort to indirect
methods such as fee schedules."'
Overcharging, on the other hand, is a problem which the
descriptive fee schedule can solve without unduly disrupting the
competitive system of pricing legal services. In the hands of the
public, the schedule would be a valuable tool to help clients and
courts determine whether a given legal fee is unjustifiably high.
While the ultimate disposition of the descriptive fee schedule
is unclear, there is some place in the ethical scheme of the legal
profession for such a schedule. Properly drawn so that it does not
prevent price competition," 3 the schedule can operate to prevent
overcharging of clients, a result beneficial both to the bar and the
public. To the extent that inevitable competitive restraints are
present, the notion of professional ethics should overcome
them."'
Lastly, the Rule against solicitation presents a more difficult
analytic problem in balancing the economic effect against the
need to preserve ethical standards. Unlike the other restraints
discussed, both the restraining characteristics and the ethical
justifications are serious and pervasive. There are clearly ethical
purposes underlying the Rule."' Nevertheless, there is a serious
111. United States v. Plymouth Dealers Ass'n of N. Calif., 286 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1961).
112. See notes 41-54 and accompanying text supra.
113. It should be noted that descriptive fee schedules are fraught with problems in
their structure. A schedule which lists true average fees compiled by an empirical study
is safely descriptive, but one which lists an average "range" of fees is clearly capable of
being used as a prescriptive fee schedule.
This problem indicates that any descriptive schedule, for maximum public utility and
minimum antitrust danger, be solely a list of average fees, and not contain any reference
to an average range.
114. See, e.g., In re Freeman's Estate, 40 App. Div. 2d 397, 341 N.Y.S. 2d 511 (1973),
aff'd on other grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480 (1974) (fee schedule which only lists
"customary fees" and does not attempt to enforce compliance does not violate New York
antitrust statute).
115. The ethical justifications for the Rule have, however, provoked considerable
criticism in recent years. See Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and
Courts, 5 HAv. CIv. RIGHTS - Civ. Lm. L. REv. 301 (1970); Comment, Advertising,
Solicitation and the Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972);
Advertising and Solicitation, supra note 65.
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economic effect-i.e., interference with the normal flow of infor-
mation in the marketplace, thereby impairing consumers' ability
to make a rational choice based on price and quality-resulting
from the near-total ban on solicitation."16
The primary justifications given for the Rule against solicita-
tion concern the effect solicitation would have upon the public.
First, the Rule prevents "stirring up litigation" by insuring that
the initial contact is made by the client. Second, by preventing
all advertising, deceptive claims of success and other misleading
devices are prevented. Third, the professional character of law is
maintained by the absence of commercialism in contact with the
public."7
The profession's dislike of "stirring up litigation" probably
has its roots in medieval fears that anyone who actually wanted
to go to court to settle a dispute was able to insure the desired
result."8 In more recent years, the fear of stirring up litigation has
developed a more sophisticated theoretical basis. The courts exist
to provide a peaceful means of settling disputes, and their mere
availability to those who actively seek them is sufficient to
achieve this result. Thus, stirring up litigation is unnecessary.
This rationale has undergone some erosion in recent years
because of the pressure of public interest. In several areas of the
law the public policy of the United States is to encourage litiga-
tion.' 9 Moreover, the ban on stirring up litigation disadvantages
only those who are not fully aware of their legal rights. This
problem has prompted the organized bar to allow solicitation by
public interest groups who have a claim and need a plaintiff to
prosecute it.29 While the fear of stirring up litigation still has
present application in areas such as "ambulance chasing",' the
116. See Part II C supra. See also Schuchman, supra note 64, at 267.
117. See Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers,
25 U. CHI. L. REv. 674 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment]. See generally V.
COUNTRYMAN AND T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (1966); CHRISTENSEN, LAW-
YERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1972).
118. See Chicago Comment, supra note 117, at 676; Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48 (1935).
119. Awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff is an oft-used method of
encouraging litigation. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Corp., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)
(stockholder's derivative action). See also Falcon, Award of Attomeys'Fees in Civil Rights
and Constitutional Cases, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973). The antitrust laws specify that
prevailing plaintiffs may recover, in addition to treble damages and costs, reasonable
attorneys' fees; see Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
120. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(B).
121. Even those who engage in such plainly unethical activities as ambulance chas-
ing are not always severely punished. See In re Cohn, 10 ll1.2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1957)
(reducing five year suspension from practice to censure).
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force of this rationale is certainly weaker than it once was; no
longer can it justify an ethical rule which bans all forms of solici-
tation. It especially fails to support a rule which primarily affects
those who are unaware of their legal rights.'2
The Rule is also defended on the ground that it prohibits
deceptive advertising. It is claimed that unscrupulous lawyers
would use hard sell methods to attract clients, make extravagant
claims, and guarantee results; in short, that "this means of pub-
licity, if permitted, will be abused."'23 However, those making
this argument assume that the only way to prevent these abuses
is to prevent solicitation altogether. In fact, it certainly seems
possible to control deceptive advertising without proscribing all
solicitation. A rule against deceptive advertising only should be
considered as a workable substitute. While there may be some
difficulty in deciding whether advertising is deceptive in an indi-
vidual case, the question of whether certain conduct is solicita-
tion is similarly difficult.'24 It is submitted that there is no ethical
need to "throw the baby out with the bath water" in this manner.
Supporters of the Rule additionally argue that the legal pro-
fession is not a business, but an arm of justice, and should not
permit the solicitation of clients because it would give the impres-
sion that the practice of law is just like any other business.2 5 This
is essentially self-delusion. The practice of law is entered into by
almost all lawyers as a means of livelihood, just like any other
business. While there may be a desire on the part of attorneys to
maintain a certain level of dignity in dealing with the public,
other businesses have similar desires. To the extent that gaudy
122. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
123. Hewitt, Advertising by Lawyers, 15 A.B.A.J. 116 (1929). See ABA CoDE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILITY, EC 2-9.
124. See, e.g., In re Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963), holding
that an article in Life mentioning a law firm by name and describing its activities was
unethical advertising. The court distinguished between publicity which is " 'the normal
by-product of able and effective service,' " and
" 'augment[ing] by artificial stimulus the publicity normally resulting from what
he does, seeing to it that his successes are broadcast and magnified. While in
hypothetical cases it may often seem difficult to draw the line between what is right
and what is not, actually, a lawyer soundly brought up in the law, who wholeheart-
edly accepts his professional status, will rarely have any difficulty in realizing the
difference. . . . (Drinker, Legal Ethics [(1960) at 218-19]) ....
18 App. Div. 2d at 478-79, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
In the last analysis, the present Rule against solicitation relies on "professional good
faith and good taste." Id. A narrower rule against deceptive, misleading or professionally
demeaning advertising would similarly rely on integrity, and be not appreciably more
difficult of administration.
125. See Chicago Comment, supra note 117, at 676.
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advertising or hard sell techniques demean the legal profession
in the eyes of the public, the ethical structure has a stake in pre-
venting it, but no further. To the contrary, limited soliciation
may well provide for better communication between the bar and
the public, to the benefit of everyone.'
21
The Rule against solicitation in its present form is a perva-
sive provision which severely restricts most forms of communica-
tion from lawyers to potential clients. As such, it is too broad to
be justified by the present ethical structure of the profession, and
should not be held exempt from the application of the Sherman
Act.
In conclusion, the doctrine of "professional immunity" has
a place in antitrust law to the extent that uniquely professional
considerations conflict with Sherman Act principles. Under a test
balancing these considerations, however, exacting scrutiny
should be given to the restrictive devices to make sure they are
the least restrictive method of achieving the ethical result de-
sired. To hold that every device that is a part of an overall scheme
of ethics escapes further Sherman Act scrutiny does not strike a
proper balance. This was a basic error in the Goldfarb decision.' 7
B. The State Action Exemption
Sherman Act policy indicates that in addition to the profes-
sional immunity doctrine, there may be a second basis on which
126. To the extent that lawyers have special duties "to make legal counsel avail-
able," ABA CODE, Canon 2, solicitation of some sort is required. For example, the ABA
CODE lists eight factors which are desirable in calculating a fee:
(1) The time and labor required. (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer. (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality . . . . (4) The amount
involved and the results obtained. (5) The time limitations imposed by the client
... (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services. (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA CODE, DR 2-106(B). Most of the factors are designed to impress upon the lawyer
that setting a fee is a personal matter. Typically, however, these factors are considered in
any important business transaction. In short, the fee is subject to negotiation between
attorney and client. The lack of any pre-contract contact places the client at a disadvan-
tage in this negotiation. Limited solicitation would even matters and allow for true indi-
vidual fee setting between attorney and client.
127. Goldfarb, 497 F.2d at 13-15. The court recognized the need to strike a balance
"between the necessities of professional regulation and the dictates of the antitrust laws."
Id. at 15. However, instead of analyzing the conflicting principles, the court accepted the
Fairfax County Bar Association's assertion that its minimum fee schedule "has a suffi-
cient part in the overall scheme devised by the State of Virginia to regulate the legal
profession to claim the form of limited immunity to antitrust prosecution available under
the 'learned profession' exemption." Id.
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a total immunity for the ethical structure of the legal profession
could rest, the state action exemption. This doctrine reasons that
when a program or pattern of conduct is carried out under the
authority or supervision of the state, it should be considered offi-
cial state action and exempt from the application of the Sherman
Act.
The leading case articulating the state action exemption is
Parker v. Brown."8 In Parker, a challenge was raised against the
California Agricultural Prorate Act'29 which authorized programs
for setting prices and marketing agricultural commodities. The
avowed purposes of the Act were to conserve agricultural re-
sources and to prevent excessive competition among farmers,
thus stabilizing farm prices. 30
The Supreme Court assumed that the program would be
illegal if undertaken by private individuals, but then held that
the Sherman Act was not applicable to states. The Sherman Act
"makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by
a state.' 31 Absent an expression of intent to have the Act apply
to states, the Court would not read it into the Act because "an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.' 132 Thus,
the Parker doctrine means, in effect, that any program found to
be "state action" cannot successfully be challenged as violative
of the Sherman Act.
Parker noted that states cannot exempt purely private con-
duct either by authorizing violations of the Sherman Act or by
declaring such conduct to be lawful.' 33 However, the Court indi-
cated that actions by private individuals or groups might be
within the exemption if the primary impetus for their action
comes from the state. In Parker, for example, although individual
farmers initiated the prorate programs and participated in them,
128. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
129. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Calif. Acts 1969 (repealed 1953).
130. There was an elaborate procedure for establishing a "prorate program" regulat-
ing the marketing of an agricultural product. First, ten growers of the crop requested that
a program be instituted. Then, a program committee was established. Its recommendation
in favor of each program was passed on by the state agricultural prorate commission and
then had to be approved by 65% of the affected area's growers, who owned at least 51% of
the land planted in that crop. After the program went into effect, unauthorized sales of
the regulated commodity were criminally punished. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933]
Calif. Acts 1969, 1971; 317 U.S. at 346.
131. 317 U.S. at 351.
132. Id. at 352.
133. Id. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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the state controlled the administration of the programs, set crimi-
nal penalties for their violation, and protected against private
gain from the program. '34
The state action doctrine distinguishes between profected
action under the authority of the state and unprotected individ-
ual conduct.'35 This distinction turns on the degree of state super-
vision over the individual activity. The cases cited by the district
and circuit courts in Goldfarb are instructive in analyzing the
type of supervision necessary to invoke the state action doctrine.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier,3 ' cited by the district
court, a state statute which restricted competition in the setting
of automobile insurance rates was upheld by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The North Carolina legislature had created a
rating bureau, composed of all the writers of automobile insur-
ance in the state,'37 and the Commissioner of Insurance of North
Carolina, who was the ex officio chairman. 138 The rating bureau
was to determine premium rates for all automobile insurers in the
state. The rates determined were not to become effective unless
"approved by the Commissioner of Insurance and not
subsequently disapproved."' 39 Under no circumstances were rates
below those approved to be charged.'40
In Allstate, five insurers sought a declaratory judgment that
the rate-fixing scheme was contrary to the Sherman Act and
therefore void. In upholding the scheme, the Fourth Circuit noted
that rate setting involved a "governmental function",' and spe-
cifically held that the rating bureau "was operated under the
active supervision of the State . ,"142 Thus it was clear that the
Parker exemption was controlling, despite the participation of
private parties in the state scheme.4 3
134. 317 U.S. at 352. See note 130 supra.
135. The state action doctrine presents an interesting anomaly with regard to the
Supremacy Clause of U.S. CONST., art. VI. The Sherman Act does not reach the actions
of a state, but it does reach private conduct; however, private conduct under active state
supervision is exempt where, if done voluntarily by private parties, it would not be. The
active intervention by the state therefore serves to supplant the Sherman Act by "reverse
Supremacy". State authorization (as opposed to supervision) of private activity does not
exempt private conduct, and the Supremacy Clause operates in that case to supplant the
state authorization. See generally Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection
under Parker v. Brown, Comment, 7 U.S.F. L. Rxv. 453 (1973).
136. 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 330 (1966).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to 248.8 (1965 Repl. Vol.).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-247(c) (1965 Repl. Vol.).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248 (1965 Repl. Vol.).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1965 Repl. Vol.).
141. 361 F.2d at 872 n.2.
142. Id. at 872.
143. Allstate was decided both on the basis of the Parker exemption and the
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The lack of active supervision was illustrated in Asheville
Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC,' where the regulation of
a private group of warehousemen was successfully challenged
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' The
Tobacco Board was composed of representatives of each of the
warehouses which were engaged in the sale of tobacco in Ashe-
ville, and was authorized by statute to "make reasonable rules
and regulations for the economical and efficient handling of the
sale of leaf tobacco at auction .... ",146 One of the rules promul-
gated by the Tobacco Board allocated selling times among the
various warehouses, and resulted in new entrants being unable to
get as much selling time as their established counterparts. One
of the new entrants filed a complaint with the FTC charging that
the regulation on selling times was an unfair method of competi-
tion in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The To-
bacco Board appealed the FTC's finding of a violation, arguing
inter alia that the Board was an "administrative agency of the
State" and therefore not subject to the antitrust laws.' 4
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
state action defense was not available to the Tobacco Board
because the promulgation of the regulations was not "adequately
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq. (1970), a statutory exemption from
federal antitrust law applicable only to the business of insurance. The court did not use
any different test in resolving both arguments in favor of non-liability under the Sherman
Act.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides for state regulation of insurance as well as the
antitrust exemption:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1970) (emphasis added).
Because of the statutory exemption in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, some courts have
required less exacting supervision by the state for insurance companies to escape liability
under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also FTC
v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1954). Allstate did not note such a distinction.
361 F.2d at 871.
144. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. §106-465 (1966 Repl. Vol.).
147. 263 F.2d at 508.
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supervised by state officials", in that the relevant state statute
only authorized the creation of the Tobacco Board and did not
supervise its activities in any way.'48 While the court recognized
that the state could regulate an industry by controlling it, and
''may even permit persons subject to such control to participate
in the regulation," private participation must be "adequately
supervised by independent state officials" in order for the state
action exemption to apply.'49
From Asheville Tobacco Board it is clear that statutory au-
thorization for a private group to make regulations is insufficient
to confer immunity from the antitrust laws under the Parker
doctrine. However, Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric
and Power Co. (Vepco),'5 ° demonstrates that a private corpora-
tion (not a state agency) can fit within the exemption. In Vepco,
an electric utility instituted a plan which effectively resulted in
free electrical hook-ups for new all-electric homes, resulting in
damage to the Gas Light Company, a competing utility.
Vepco was subject to the regulation of the Virginia State
Corporation Commission (SCC), which was required by statute
to investigate "promotional allowances and practices of public
utilities and . . . take such action as such investigation may
indicate to be in the public interest."' 5 ' The SCC was also empow-
ered to review and alter the rate schedules submitted to it by the
utilities, which were required to file the schedules with the
agency.'52 On these facts, the court held that the SCC qualified
under Parker as a state agency.'53
The court then determined that the SCC regulated Vepco
sufficiently to bring the utility within the Parker doctrine. Al-
though the SCC neither made an investigation nor expressly ap-
proved the rates at issue in the case, the court held that affirma-
tive pronouncements were not necessary, "unless one equates
administrative silence with abandonment of administrative duty.
It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent, i.e.,
approval. ' ' 54 That the latter inference was correct in this case was
clear to the court because the SCC had the authority to stop
Vepco's rates from becoming effective and, at a later date, ac-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-247 (1969).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-236 (1969).
153. 438 F.2d at 251.
154. Id. at 252.
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tually did so.1 5 Since Vepco's promotional rates were given tacit
approval by the SCC, the Parker doctrine prevented liability
under the antitrust laws.'56
It appears that some evidence of actual and active considera-
tion of private activities by a state agency is necessary for the
Parker exemption. The challenged restraint must be considered
and approved by the state, expressly or impliedly, because the
state cannot authorize private persons to violate the antitrust
laws.'57
Goldfarb explored the application of these principles to the
legal profession. The defendant Virginia State Bar was estab-
lished pursuant to statute58 and court rules of the Virginia Su-
155. Id.
156. The court noted that the statutes governing the SCC provided a procedure for
complaints by citizens against proposed rates. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-238 (1969). With
this state-created avenue for challenging the rates, the court held that the plaintiff should
have gone in the first instance to the SCC: "The antitrust laws are a poor substitute, we
think, for plaintiff's failure to promptly protest to the SCC and to seek the administrative
remedy ultimately shown to have been available and effective." Id. at 252. See also
Norman's on the Waterfront v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
157. Other theories on the rationale behind the Parker exemption have been ad-
vanced by the court and commentators besides the "active supervision and approval" test.
The ninth circuit apparently is moving toward a very strict test under which even action
specifically approved by a state agency may be challenged under the Sherman Act. See
United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Calif. 1973) (merger
approved by state agency pursuant to statute requiring such approval still subject to
antitrust attack); International Tel. & Tel. v. General Tel. & Elec., 351 F. Supp. 1153,
1203 n.129 (D. Hawaii 1972) (criticizing Vepco as "an unwarranted hyperextension of
Parker").
See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972), where the court suggested that federal law always controlled that of the
states and the essential inquiry was whether Congress intended to allow the states to
escape antitrust liability. See Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for
State Action Exemption, 24 HAST. L.J. 287 (1973). But cf. New Mexico v. American
Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (actions of the state itself are never subject
to the Sherman Act).
See also Simmons and Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An
Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 61 (1974), advocating a
"mandatory" standard which would exempt under Parker only those private acts which
are required by state law. Cf. Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co., 480 F.2d
754 (4th Cir. 1973); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
See generally Bachelder, Antitrust Exemptions: State-Approved Transactions, 33
ANTrrrusT L.J. 99 (1967); Donnan, Federal Antitrust Law versus Anticompetitive State
Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970); Note, State Action Exemption from the Anti-
trust Laws, 50 B.U. L. REv. 393 (1970); Comment, Antitrust Immunity-Reevaluation and
Synthesis of Parker-Brown-Intent, State Action, Causation, 19 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1245
(1973).
158. The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promul-
gate and amend rules and regulations organizing and governing the association
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preme Court,'59 while the Fairfax County Bar Association was a
private group of attorneys not created by any instrumentality of
the state, but affiliated with the Virginia State Bar.
The district court and Fourth Circuit both held that the
Virginia State Bar was sufficiently regulated by the state to come
within the Parker exemption, but that the Fairfax County Bar
Association did not. The result reached as to the Fairfax County
Bar Association seems sound. The prior cases indicate unequivo-
cally that some meaningful state supervision of an activity is
required under Parker. This was totally lacking in the case of the
Fairfax County Bar, which was free to publish its minimum fee
schedule without prior approval from the State Bar or the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.'60 The fact that the members of the Fairfax
County Bar Association were all members of the Virginia State
Bar and, as such, were regulated by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia did not alter this conclusion.
The Virginia State Bar was placed within the exemption by
both courts, because the mechanism for disciplining violations of
fee schedules was created within the scope of the statutory
authority of the State of Virginia.' 6 ' The Court of Appeals for the
known as the Virginia State Bar, composed of the attorneys at law of this State, to
act as an administrative agency of the Court....
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (Supp. 1974).
159. See In re Virginia State Bar, 205 Va. 1011 (1968), 210 Va. 411 (1970), authoriz-
ing the State Bar to publish opinions concerning professional ethics.
160. 355 F. Supp. at 496; 497 F.2d at 12.
161. The district court noted that the Virginia State Bar had an exceedingly "minor
role" in the setting of minimum fees, since the ethical opinions written by it were never
used to discipline any Virginia lawyer for violating a minimum fee schedule. It was thus
clear to the court that, in publishing opinions, the State Bar was within its statutory and
rule-created authority. 355 F. Supp. at 495-96. See notes 158-59 supra. The court limited
this holding somewhat by suggesting that, if the State Bar itself should adopt a minimum
fee schedule, it would be outside its authority and thus subject to the Sherman Act. 355
F. Supp. at 496 n.4.
On appeal, the fourth circuit held that the full range of ethical activities, including
the promulgation of fee schedules if desired, was within the authority of the State Bar.
497 F.2d at 11. In doing so, the court relied on a stipulation to that effect which was not
accepted by the trial court, because it was a question of law. 355 F. Supp. at 492 n.2. See
497 F.2d at 20-21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
Cf. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974), where the
Oregon State Bar, another integrated bar established by statute, was denied Parker im-
munity. The court, in disapproving the reasoning in Goldfarb, noted that the stipulation
concerning statutory authority did not exist in the Oregon case. In addition, the court
adopted a stricter Parker test which denied Parker immunity because "the fee schedules
published and distributed by [the Oregon State Bar] were neither debated in public
hearings nor approved by a disinterested state commission. In short, there is not the
substantial state direction and involvement required to meet the legislative mandate
requirements and to elevate these Oregon State Bar activities to the plateau of 'state
action' immunity." Id. at 511.
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Fourth Circuit first held that the State Bar could not claim
Parker immunity on the grounds that it was a state agency, be-
cause it is composed solely of those who are regulated, i.e., the
lawyers of Virginia." 2 The remaining issue was whether the State
Bar was "adequately supervised by independent State officials",
i.e., the Supreme Court of Virginia, and thus could claim that its
activities were exempt from the Sherman Act." 3 In holding that
such supervision existed, the court noted that, although the opin-
ions on ethics and the fee schedule reports were not expressly
approved by the Virginia court, silence should not be construed
as "failure to adequately supervise", following the Vepco case:
"The Virginia Court has the authority to regulate and supervise
the State Bar; we will not infer abandonment of that authority
because of claimed inactivity.' '164
It seems clear that a prescriptive fee schedule adopted by the
Virginia State Bar itself would pass the Parker test as framed by
the Fourth Circuit, as its adoption by the State Bar would stand
on the same legal footing as the ethical opinions which it
published.'65 But either result rests on dubious policy. While the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility was explicitly adopted
162. 497 F.2d at 11 n.31.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id.
165. Under Virginia law, the State Supreme Court has the authority to "prescribe,
adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations:
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the conduct of attorneys-at-law. VA.
CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1974 Repl. Vol.). Pursuant to this authority, the court adopted the
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
Part 6, §§ I-Il (as amended Jan. 1, 1971).
In addition, the Supreme Court of Virginia has, pursuant to statutory authority,
established the Virginia State Bar and empowered it to write the opinions which tied in
undercutting local minimum fee schedules with ethics. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974
Repl. Vol.).
The fourth circuit held in Goldfarb that the opinions written by the Virginia State
Bar were a part of the general ethical scheme of regulation in the state. Further, the court
found specific authority in DR 2-106 for the. promulgation of a minimum fee schedule.
That DR generally concerns excessive fees, but indicates eight factors for determining a
reasonable fee, one of which is "the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services." DR 2-106(B)(3). This language was held to encompass the publication of fee
schedules as a means of determining reasonable fees. 497 F.2d at 10 n.30.
In United States v. Oregon State Bar, in which the state bar had actually published
a minimum fee schedule, the identical language in the Oregon Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility was rejected as authority for the schedule's promulgation. The Oregon Code
of Professional Responsibility was adopted pursuant to statutory authority similar to
Virginia's, by the Oregon Supreme Court. The district court held, however, that the
prohibition on "clearly excessive" fees in DR 2-106 could not be interpreted as authority
to set a floor under legal fees through the use of a minimum fee schedule. 385 F. Supp. at
511-12.
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by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the opinions concerning en-
forcement of local minimum fee schedules were not. The implied-
approval-by-silence rationale should not apply here because there
is no specialized administrative or judicial scheme to support the
inference of the supreme court's consideration and approval of
actions by the State Bar. Moreover, there is no express method
for an aggrieved party to complain to the state supreme court;
such a procedure in Vepco supported the inference that the regu-
latory agency was awaiting a complaint before acting. In the case
of ethical opinions, it is much more realistic to infer that the state
supreme court had never made a determination. The Fourth Cir-
cuit's reliance on the "implied approval" rationale of Vepco
therefore seems misplaced, and express approval by the state
supreme court of the activities of the Virginia State Bar should
have been required. 6 ' Absent the implied-approval-by-silence
rationale, the opinions on ethics which supplied the formal sanc-
tions for violating the locally adopted fee schedules were neither
compelled by the state nor subject to active state supervision. A
genuinely independent guardian of the public interest was thus
not present, and the Parker exemption should have been denied.
The various activities undertaken by bar associations should
be tested under this principle to determine whether their method
of adoption can legitimately clothe them with Parker immunity.
Of the restraints examined in this comment, the only one which
clearly falls within the exemption under this test is the Rule
against solicitation contained in the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. The adoption of the ABA Code as a rule of court
by the highest court of a state certainly amounts to the "active
166. An argument which has sometimes been made in favor of applying the Parker
doctrine draws an analogy with the administrative law notion of primary jurisdiction. The
argument suggests that a federal court should defer to the state bar association or the state
supreme court for analysis of an ethical device with antitrust implications. See Wisconsin
Fee Schedule, supra note 3, at 1250-51. In the federal government, the doctrine has been
used extensively to allow administrative agencies to decide an antitrust case before a
federal district court. See JAFFE AND NATHANSON, ADMINisTRATIVE LAW 669-72 (1968).
In Communication Brokers v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co., 370 F. Supp. 967 (W.D.
Va. 1974), it was held that the analogy was apt, and that the plaintiff would have to
complain to the Virginia SCC before bringing its antitrust claim in federal court. The
import of this decision seems to be that a plaintiff must attempt to resolve his case on
state law grounds before bringing a federal suit under the Sherman Act. Certainly this
reasoning can have no application in the case of the legal profession, where no formalized
scheme exists for testing the legality under state law of the ethical restraints imposed by
the bar. Cf. Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir.
1973).
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supervision" by independent state officials required by the
Parker rationale. 67
The profession could conceivably preserve fee schedules, in-
cluding the prescriptive variety, by similarly submitting them to
the highest court of each state for approval, but this would sub-
ject the profession to active regulation by the state. This ap-
proach is undesirable for several reasons; the public will see the
state judiciary approving of a device which will have the effect of
increasing the income of lawyers, and will surmise, rightly or
wrongly, that an alliance has been forged for such a purpose.
Moreover, a trend toward active supervision of fees can only lead
to active supervision over services themselves. The potential dan-
ger is that active regulation by the state will erode the attitude
of independent responsibility on the part of individual attorneys.
While it is perhaps desirable to insure that a lawyer consider the
proper factors in setting a fee, the application of these factors to
a particular case should not be governed by a prescriptive sched-
ule of fees which lessens the individual responsibility of the law-
yer.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that serious conflicts exist between the public
interest in competition in the delivery of legal services and the
restraints present in the ethical structure of the profession. Any
argument by the organized bar for total immunity from the anti-
trust laws is essentially one for not permitting any public resolu-
tion of these conflicts. This position is untenable.
In the area of professional ethics, some conflicts will likely be
resolved in favor of ethical rules and against the policy of free
competition underlying the Sherman Act. The "partial" immun-
ity from the Sherman Act strikes the proper balance, requiring
ethical justification for each rule challenged on antitrust grounds.
Special consideration for the necessity of some ethical rules
should be given, because professional ethics too are part of the
public interest. "Partial" immunity makes this comparison and
weighs ethical behavior against the need for greater competition
in the profession.
The public interest also is served by the state action exemp-
tion, which allows states freedom of action to pursue their own
policies as long as the resultant economic effects are actively
167. Judicial action should have the same weight as legislative action under the
Parker doctrine. Both are embodiments of the power of the state. 355 F. Supp at 495. See
also New Mexico v. American Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (semble).
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controlled by the state. Thus, the organized bar can probably
choose those restraints which are considered necessary to the eth-
ical structure of the profession and immunize them from antitrust
attack by obtaining the approval of independent state officials.
The profession itself must either remain subject to the Sherman
Act or become subject to active state regulation. There is no
middle ground. As long as the profession is unwilling to become
more formally regulated from without, the Sherman Act should
remain a powerful weapon to protect the public interest in com-
petition within the legal profession.
